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I. INTRODUCTION
California is currently facing the worst housing shortage in the mainland
United States.1 One can see and feel the consequences of this shortage through
higher housing costs, increased poverty, and homelessness.2 The causes, however,

* J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2023; B.A.
Political Science, University of California, San Diego, 2010. I would like to thank my partner, Hillary Carneal,
without whom I may never have found the courage to attend law school and has supported me every step of the
way. I would also like to thank the Law Review staff for their tireless efforts in reviewing and editing this Note.
1. See MAC TAYLOR, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., CALIFORNIA’S HIGH HOUSING COSTS CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 3, 5 (Mar. 17, 2015), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2015/finance/housing-costs/housing-costs.pdf (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (showing California is second only to Hawaii in its housing
shortage).
2. Matt Levin, Five Things I’ve Learned Covering California’s Housing Crisis that You Should Know,
CALMATTERS (Jan. 12, 2021), https://calmatters.org/housing/2021/01/california-housing-crisis-lessons (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).

401

2021 / The Environment is Our Home
include a number of factors: for example, high demand met with low supply, lowdensity development, community resistance, environmental review, and
development costs.3 While each cause reduces housing alone, together they
exacerbate the housing crisis.4 A common example is where communities in lowdensity housing areas resist high-density housing projects.5 Community resistance
often comes in the form of environmental lawsuits—even if their true grievance
has nothing to do with the environment.6 The litigation-caused delays dramatically
increase costs to developers, frequently causing them to abandon projects.7
This type of litigation delay happened to the empty corner lot on First and
Lorena Street in the Boyle Heights neighborhood of Los Angeles.8 A nonprofit
organization that builds high-density affordable housing sought to build an
apartment with forty-nine units on that corner. Twenty-four of those units would
be for veterans with disabilities experiencing homelessness.9 However, Boyle
Heights is mostly single-family homes and—in an effort to maintain that
complexion—a neighbor filed an environmental lawsuit to oppose the project.10
The neighbor alleged that the project did not mitigate the project’s environmental
impacts and demanded the approving agency conduct more reviews of the
environmental impacts.11 The lawsuit effectively stalled the housing project,
leaving the lot empty to this day and depriving low-income families and disabled
veterans of desperately needed housing.12
The law that enables these lawsuits is the California Environmental Quality
Act (“CEQA”), California’s signature environmental law.13 CEQA’s purpose is
“to enhance environmental quality and to control environmental pollution.”14
Despite CEQA’s admirable goals, developers, lawmakers, and even previous
California governors have recognized CEQA as an impediment to housing
development.15 A quarter of all CEQA lawsuits between 2013 and 2015 were
3. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 1 (describing California’s housing crisis as a combination of these
factors).
4. Id.
5. See id. at 15, 19 (explaining that local communities control housing density and resist new housing
through land use authority).
6. M. Nolan Gray, How Californians Are Weaponizing Environmental Law, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/03/signature-environmental-law-hurts-housing/618264 (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Gray, supra note 6.
12. Id.
13. See generally CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000–21189 (West 2021) (encompassing more than a hundred
sections across six chapters).
14. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(f) (West 2021) (declaring environmental quality and pollution to be
statewide concerns).
15. Gray, supra note 6; see Alastair Bland, Weakling or Bully? The Battle Over CEQA, the State’s Iconic
Environmental Law, CALMATTERS (updated June 23, 2020), https://calmatters.org/economy/2019/05/weakling-
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against housing projects, the biggest percentage of any project type—more than
industrial, commercial, and mining combined.16 This year, Senators and Assembly
Members have introduced five bills to streamline, expedite, or exempt housing
projects from CEQA review.17 One of these bills is Senate Bill 7 (“SB 7”).18
SB 7 seeks to streamline environmental review by expediting judicial
challenges to certified housing projects.19 It does this by reviving AB 900, a law
that streamlined judicial review of large multi-use projects and expanded eligibility
to affordable housing projects that meet environmental building standards.20 SB 7
will facilitate housing production in California by shortening the timeline for
judicial review and thereby shortening the overall expected timeline of qualified
housing projects.21 However, due to finite judicial resources, its effectiveness may
be short-lived without further limitations on CEQA lawsuits to ensure true
advocacy for the environment.22
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
From its inception, CEQA has sought to balance environmental concerns with
economic development.23 In the last twenty years, legislators introduced and
passed several streamlining measures to strike that balance.24 First, Section A
outlines CEQA and its main provisions as they relate to housing.25 Second, Section
B discusses AB 900—the bill that created the framework of judicial streamlining
for specific types of projects—and explains the criteria the projects must meet.26

or-bully-ceqa-environmental-law-california-development-battles (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (recalling Governor Jerry Brown calling CEQA reform, “The Lord’s work”).
16. Jennifer Hernandez, California Environmental Quality Act Lawsuits and California’s Housing Crisis,
24 HASTINGS L.J. 21, 26 (2018).
17. See generally AB 1486, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (prohibiting a court from stopping a
city’s update to housing goals and objectives under CEQA); see also AB 1277, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal.
2021) (expediting judicial review of student housing projects under CEQA); SB 621, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess.
(Cal. 2021) (streamlining CEQA review for hotel to housing conversions); SB 9, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess.
(Cal. 2021) (establishing ministerial review process to exempt housing projects from CEQA).
18. See generally SB 7, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (streamlining judicial review for certain
housing projects).
19. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 7, at 3 (May 7, 2021) [hereinafter ASSEMBLY FLOOR].
20. Id. at 1.
21. Id. at 3.
22. Id.
23. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15003 (West 2021).
24. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 7, at 9 (Feb. 22,
2021) (listing seven bills related to SB 7 that either passed into law or died) [hereinafter SENATE COMMITTEE];
JANET SMITH-HEIMER ET AL., CEQA IN THE 21ST CENTURY 9–11 (2016) (listing ten bills for new CEQA
exemptions and four bills for judicial streamlining for CEQA).
25. Infra Section II.A.
26. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21178, 80–89.3 (repealed January 1, 2021) (reviving those sections that AB
900 originally enacted); infra Section II.B.
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A. CEQA and the Environmental Benefits of Infill Housing
CEQA is a landmark piece of legislation that directs government agencies to
conserve California’s natural environment.27 Two of the most important goals of
CEQA are to “prevent[t] environmental damage, while providing a decent home
and satisfying living environment for every Californian.”28 Ronald Reagan signed
CEQA into law in 1970 on the heels of the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”), the federal version of CEQA.29 It was the first state law of its kind and
led other states to adopt environmental legislation, using CEQA as a model.30 At
fifty years old, the law has evolved considerably—and generated much
controversy.31
At the heart of CEQA is the Environmental Impact Report (“EIR”), in which
the permitting agency details the significant environmental effects of a proposed
project or activity.32 “Significant effects” are those that pose a substantial and
adverse effect on the environment.33 Unlike other environmental statutes which
regulate specific standards of quality, CEQA requires the government agency to
inform itself about possible environmental impacts that are not yet specifically
regulated.34 The government agency assesses the significant effects based upon
available scientific data, and the views of community members in the affected
areas through direct engagement.35
Housing projects can pose a number of environmental impacts.36 The broad
categories of impacts include not only classic environmental concerns such as
water quality and air quality, but also personal enjoyment issues such as recreation
and aesthetics.37 Some of the environmental impacts of housing can have severe
consequences, such as a lack of clean and plentiful water supply and increased
transportation causing congestion and greenhouse gas emissions (“GHGs”).38 Yet,
27. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(a) (West 2021) (finding that protecting California’s natural
environment is a “matter of statewide concern”).
28. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(g) (West 2021).
29. Gray, supra note 6.
30. Id. (indicating that fifteen states followed after California enacted CEQA).
31. See id. (discussing of expansion of CEQA projects to include private projects); James Brasuell,
Evaluating CEQA: The Controversial Law Turns 50, PLANETIZEN (Dec. 8, 2020),
https://www.planetizen.com/news/2020/12/111468-evaluating-ceqa-controversial-law-turns-50 (on file with the
University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing controversy and criticisms from supporters and opponents to
CEQA).
32. County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 810 (Cal. App. 3d., 1973).
33. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21068 (West 2021).
34. CAL. COMM. INT. DEV. L. & PRAC., PURPOSES OF CEQA § 12:182 (2020 ed.) [hereinafter PURPOSES
OF CEQA].
35. See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15064 (b)–(c) (West 2021) (explaining how to “[d]etermin[e]
the Significance of the Environmental Effects Caused by a Project”).
36. See generally CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § Appendix G (West 2021) (listing broad categories of
environmental impacts).
37. See id. § Appendix G (listing broad categories of environmental impacts).
38. See id. § Appendix G (listing broad categories of environmental impacts); see also U.S. DEP’T OF
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some environmental impacts can be quite trivial, such as obstructing a scenic vista
of a private residence.39
Housing projects are often subject to CEQA because city governments have
retained discretion to approve or deny housing projects.40 A city or county
government does not need to prepare an EIR if it is “ministerial” rather than
“discretionary.”41A decision is “ministerial” when a reviewing agency merely
determines if the project comports with the provisions of the zoning law.42 In
contrast, a decision is “discretionary” when it requires a government agency to
exercise some sort of judgment on whether or how to complete a project.43
Discretionary approval of housing projects is particularly prevalent for apartments
and condominiums, especially in urban areas.44
Housing projects in high-density urban areas are known as “infill” housing
projects.45 Uses for infill sites include residential, retail, commercial, transit
stations, schools, public office buildings, or a combination thereof.46 By bringing
these essential services closer together, infill projects benefit the environment by
reducing the need for car travel and reducing GHGs.47 While CEQA has several
provisions that recognize the inherent environmental benefits of infill projects,
many housing projects remain discretionary and therefore require government
agencies to conduct an EIR.48
B. AB 900 – Fast-Tracking Environmentally-Friendly Projects
In 2011, the California legislature passed AB 900, the Jobs and Economic
Improvement Through Environmental Leadership Act, which created streamlining
procedures under CEQA for judicial review of qualifying projects.49 Under AB
TRANSP., EVOLVING USE OF LEVEL OF SERVICE METRICS IN TRANSPORTATION ANALYSIS 2 (2017) ,
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/LOS%20Case%20Study%20California_508.pdf
(describing measurements models for emissions that housing may cause) [hereinafter L EVEL OF SERVICE].
39. Hernandez, supra note 16, at 58.
40. Id. at 61, 92.
41. McCorkle Eastside Neighborhood Grp. v. City of St. Helena, 31 Cal. App. 5th 80, 89–92 (2018); C AL.
CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15357 (West 2021).
42. Id. at 89.
43. See id. § 15357 (indicating “ministerial” projects that likely comply with the general plan and
“discretionary” as ones that deviate somewhat from the general plan).
44. See Hernandez, supra note 16, at 61 (indicating that local agencies retain discretion to add conditions
or downsize projects).
45. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061.3 (West 2021) (defining “infill” as a site previously developed for urban
uses or is adjacent to urban use sites).
46. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21094.5(e)(1)(A) (West 2021); id. § 21061.3 (defining “infill” as a site
previously developed for urban uses or is adjacent to urban use sites).
47. WILLIAM SCHROEER, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, THE TRANSPORTATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS
OF INFILL VERSUS GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT: A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 1 (1999).
48. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21094.5 (West 2021) (directing how EIRs are to be evaluated for infill
sites); see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21099 (West 2021) (indicating infill sites as a criteria that promotes
reduction of GHGs)
49. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21178, 80–89.3 (repealed January 1, 2021).
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900, legal challenges to the EIR are entitled to an expedited schedule, to the extent
feasible.50 Originally, challengers could go directly to the Court of Appeal, but the
Alameda Superior Court found this constitutionally invalid, so challenges must
now begin at the lowest court.51 This decision required an amendment to the law,
as it originally guaranteed a compressed schedule of 175 days for a court decision,
which is now 270 days to account for lower court processing.52
The Legislature originally intended AB 900 to streamline so-called “megaprojects” that would result in an investment of 100 million dollars.53 These projects
are known as Environmental Leadership Development Projects (“ELDPs”) and are
not only residential, but also retail, commercial, sports, cultural, entertainment, or
recreational use.54 A key aspect of these projects is that developers must build them
on an infill site.55 Examples EDLPs include the Golden State Warriors stadium in
San Francisco and the Apple Campus 2 in Cupertino.56 Notably, while seventeen
projects enjoy AB 900 certification, only two are completed, and neither of them
included housing.57
Perhaps most importantly, EDLPs must comply with environmental building
standards known as Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (“LEED”).58
LEED certification is the first nationwide environmentally-friendly building rating
system, which the United States Green Building Council, a private nonprofit
corporation, established in 1993.59 Under LEED, projects earn points based on
their conformance to accepted green building principles like site selection,
resource efficiency, energy conservation, water conservation, and indoor
environmental quality.60 Projects that earn the most points achieve “Platinum”
designation—the highest rating—while fewer points receive “Gold” or “Silver”
designation, or simply “LEED Certified” for the minimum standard.61 Originally,
AB 900 required Silver designation, but AB 246 in 2017 strengthened that
requirement to Gold certification.62 In essence, LEED certification is an indication

50. ASSEMBLY FLOOR,supra note 19, at 2.
51. Id.; see also CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21185, invalidated by Planning and Conservation League v. State
of California, No. RG1262904 (Alameda Sup. Ct.) (explaining that it was inconsistent with where writs of
mandate can be brought).
52. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21185; ASSEMBLY FLOOR, supra note 19, at 2.
53. BRIAN GOGGIN, MEASURING THE LENGTH OF THE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT REVIEW PROCESS IN SAN
FRANCISCO 43 (Carol Galante & Paul Waddell eds., 2018).
54. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21180(b)(1) (West 2021).
55. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21180(b) (repealed January 1, 2021); infra Section II.A.
56. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, supra note 19, at 3.
57. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 7, at 8 (Apr. 28,
2021) (noting that AB 900 also was the framework for project-specific SB 743 for the Sacramento Kings arena).
58. Id. § 21180(b)(1) .
59. Jonathan Riker, The Green Zone, L.A. LAW. (Jan. 30, 2008) at 28 (2008).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. SENATE COMMITTEE, supra note 24, at 7.
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that a project utilizes specific green building technologies and strategies along
well-established metrics.63
Though LEED certification and infill buildings have distinct environmental
benefits, projects certified under AB 900 will still need environmental review
under CEQA.64 Recall, rather than imposing a set of regulations on a project,
CEQA directs agencies to inform themselves of the potential environmental
impacts of a project.65 While LEED might satisfy specific criteria, a project may
pose environmental impacts that differ from those criteria that a local government
agency must investigate by conducting an EIR.66 AB 900 does not interrupt this
process, nor does it stop someone from challenging the sufficiency of an EIR in
court.67 Instead, it provides a finite amount of time that litigation may delay
projects that satisfy its criteria.68
III. SB 7
Senate leader Toni Atkins introduced SB 7 to address California’s housing
shortage by streamlining judicial challenges for affordable housing projects that
meet environmental building standards.69 AB 900, the original legislation creating
the streamlining process for judicial review for large multi-use projects, expired
on January 21, 2021.70 SB 7 reenacts AB 900 for five years and expands eligibility
for EDLPs to include smaller housing projects.71
SB 7 augments certain criteria of EDLPs to include smaller housing projects
while still maintaining environmental building standards.72 Instead of requiring an
investment minimum of 100 million dollars, the bill caps eligibility at 100 million
dollars and lowers the minimum to 15 million dollars.73 At least 15% of the units
must be affordable to lower-income households—those who would qualify for
Section 8 housing vouchers.74 The housing project must be located on a previously

63. Riker, supra note 59, at 28.
64. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21189 (repealed January 1, 2021) (indicating that EIRs are required for
projects described in this chapter which include LEED certified projects).
65. Supra Section II.A.; PURPOSES OF CEQA, supra note 34.
66. See generally CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21178, 80–89.3 (repealed January 1, 2021) (indicating that
certified projects will result in a net decrease in GHGs and will receive streamlined CEQA review); ASSEMBLY
FLOOR, supra note 19.
67. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21189 (West 2021) (”[N]othing in this chapter affects the duty to comply”
with CEQA).
68. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21185 (West 2021).
69. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, supra note 19, at 2–3.
70. SENATE COMMITTEE, supra note 24, at 1.
71. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21178 , 80–89.3 (amended by Chapter 19).
72. See id. §§ 21178, 80–89.3 (indicating that EDLPs now include investments of less than $100 million
and must include affordable housing).
73. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21180 (amended by Chapter 19).
74. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21180(b)(4) (amended by Chapter 19); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
50079.5 (West 2021).
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undeveloped infill site and hold gold-level LEED certification.75 The project
developer will then apply to the California Governor for certification as an EDLP
to receive the judicial streamlining benefit.76 Lastly, SB 7 clarifies that the
expedited judicial review period of 270 days includes both the court of appeal and
California Supreme Court.77
IV. ANALYSIS
CEQA was born out of the desire to balance development with protecting the
environment to create a “decent home” for every Californian.78 The irony is that
CEQA itself is stopping housing production because parties that are unconcerned
with protecting the environment bring CEQA challenges to projects.79 Overcoming
California’s housing crisis while preserving its natural environment requires
legislators to carefully consider how to process lawsuits brought under CEQA.80
The growing proportion of CEQA challenges to affordable housing projects with
clear environmental benefits shows the need for such legislation.81
Section A shows how SB 7 will facilitate desperately needed housing
production by shortening the window of judicial review to 270 days for certified
housing projects.82 Section B examines whether SB 7’s language sufficiently
mandates the courts to act within the deadline, and whether the overloaded court
system can facilitate the condensed litigation schedule.83 Section C discusses how
to prevent frivolous lawsuits under CEQA in the first place while still maintaining
environmental protections.84
A. SB 7 Remedies Long Litigation Delays for Housing Projects
SB 7 will facilitate housing production because it reduces the overall time
period for litigation and makes that time period definite.85 First, this section will
describe the problem SB 7 addresses by citing statistics on court processing

75. SENATE COMMITTEE, supra note 24, at 7; see CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21061.3 (defining “infill” as an
empty site located in an urban area that is more than ten years old).
76. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21182 (West 2021).
77. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21185 (amended by Chapter 19).
78. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(g) (West 2021).
79. See JENNIFER HERNANDEZ, CALIFORNIA GETTING IN ITS OWN WAY 6 (Joel Kotkin ed., 2019)
(indicating that parties bring lawsuits under CEQA for non-environmental reasons).
80. See Hernandez, supra note 16, at 48 (advocating for modest reform to CEQA to ensure environmental
health and encourage affordable housing projects).
81. See id. (citing statistics showing 25% of CEQA lawsuits challenge housing, and 80% of those are
against infill projects).
82. Infra Section IV.A.
83. Infra Section IV.B.
84. Infra Section IV.C.
85. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, supra note 19, at 2.
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timelines.86 Second, this section will examine two aspects of how SB 7 will create
more housing: (1) reducing the overall timeline of housing production and (2)
having a reasonable expectation of what that timeline will be.
In general, the time it takes the court system to process any civil lawsuit can
take years.87 While lower court review for most cases resolves within twelve
months, some cases can take over two years.88 If a party appeals the lower court
decision, the appellate court process can be just as lengthy, with most cases taking
over a year and a half for a decision but some districts take as long as four years.89
Similarly, the California Supreme Court process can take well over a year when
accounting for filing, decision to review, allowing each party to file briefs, and oral
argument scheduling.90 A case that starts at the local courthouse and goes all the
way up to the California Supreme Court can take as little as one year but can take
as long as eight years.91 That timeline only increased in the decade preceding
2020.92 Further, the COVID-19 pandemic significantly reduced the number of
cases being processed due to courtroom closures and implementation of remotehearing procedures, compounding the existing backlog.93
Given that judicial review can approach a decade, SB 7’s goal of 270 days—
less than nine months—is a tremendous streamlining provision.94 Indeed, the delay
in judicial review matches the processing time for CEQA lawsuits as well.95 Due
to their technical complexity, most CEQA lawsuits take three to five years to
resolve, but can extend to a full decade.96 Further, if an EIR is deficient, the courts
send it back to the government agency to conduct further environmental review,
causing even more delay in the process.97 While SB 7 does not do anything to
reduce the deficiencies courts might find in an EIR, streamlining the process of
finding those problems will mean projects can start sooner.98
86. See generally JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, STATEWIDE CASELOAD TRENDS 2009–10 THROUGH
2018–19 (2020) (citing statistics on court processing times in California courts); Hernandez, supra note 16, at 43.
87. See generally JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 86.
88. Id. at 81.
89. Id. at 36.
90. See generally CALIFORNIA COURTS PRACTICES & PROCEDURES, https://www.courts.ca.gov/2962.htm
(last visited Dec. 17, 2021) (indicating that each step takes two to three months, with scheduling for oral argument
itself taking a few months to a year).
91. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 86, at 36, 81; CALIFORNIA COURTS PRACTICES &
PROCEDURES, https://www.courts.ca.gov/2962.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2021).
92. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 86, at 81.
93. Robert Lewis, Justice Delayed: Courts Overwhelmed by Pandemic Backlog, CALMATTERS (Jan. 19,
2021), https://calmatters.org/justice/2021/01/justice-courts-overwhelmed-pandemic (on file with the University
of the Pacific Law Review).
94. SB 7, 2021 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021).
95. Hernandez, supra note 16, at 43.
96. See id. (noting CEQA review and lawsuits tend to deal with technical scientific studies or data).
97. See Hernandez, supra note 16, at 41 (explaining that courts most commonly “vacate” agency approval
of EIRs for agencies to redo it).
98. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21189 (West 2021) (“[N]othing in this chapter affects the duty to comply”
with CEQA).
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Most directly, shortening judicial review to less than 270 days will produce
more housing because there will be less time spent waiting in court until building
can actually begin99 Housing production is already a lengthy process and includes:
preliminary planning, obtaining permits, and construction.100 The permitting
process in San Francisco, for example, can take two to four years for an apartment
building—which includes the time the court spends reviewing the original EIR.101
This is nearly equal to the length of time it takes to physically build the project,
including the preparation and construction stage.102 In the last decade, the median
time for a housing project in San Francisco to reach completion took nearly four
years, with many projects taking more than ten.103 This is all assuming that the EIR
is not challenged, which, given delays in judicial review, could double that time.104
A project certified under SB 7 would reduce the judicial review from an ambiguous
three to five years to a finite 270 days, a phenomenal improvement.105
Further, more reliability in litigation timelines will encourage the construction
of more housing because investors will know what timeline to expect.106 When
there is uncertainty in an investment, developers will delay beginning the project,
especially when timelines are long.107 After the uncertainty is reduced to an
acceptable level, investment increases to meet the pending demand.108 This
dynamic is presently playing out in the California housing market, as shown by the
number of building permits remaining essentially flat.109 The uncertainty in
developing housing in California is so high that investors are not even requesting
permits, despite high demand.110
And the demand is certainly high.111 California will need to build 100,000 extra
housing units annually to effectively reduce housing costs and keep up with
population growth—beyond the already planned 100,000–140,000 units.112 By

99. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526(a)(3) (West 2021) (indicating that one may stop an action that would
have its harmful effect during litigation).
100. GOGGIN, supra note 53, at 3, 10 (noting that there is no comprehensive accounting of the permitting
processes in California).
101. Id. at 18. (noting that CEQA review can take weeks, months, or even years).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 17.
104. Hernandez, supra note 16, at 43.
105. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21185 (amended by Chapter 19).
106. Scott R. Baker et al., Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty, 131 Q.J. ECON. 1, 3 (2015).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 11 (showing fewer housing permits in coastal areas despite more demand
in those areas).
110. Id. at 10 (indicating that barriers prevent developers from responding to high demand to live in coastal
areas); Bland, supra note 15 (suggesting that the spectre of litigation is enough to discourage development).
111. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 10.
112. Id. at 34–35 (estimating a shortage of 80,000 units yearly for thirty years will need 100,000 per year
to catch up).
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providing more certainty for investors, SB 7 will facilitate the pending demand for
building housing.113
B. Bypassing the Bottle-neck Just to Make a New One
SB 7’s effectiveness may be limited because the language of the bill is not
mandatory, which could result in courts exceeding the 270-day timeline.114 To
ensure that eligible projects will receive streamlining, SB 7 says in relevant part:
“[T]he Judicial Council shall adopt a rule . . . that require . . . proceedings . . . to
be resolved, to the extent feasible, within 270 days . . . .”115 The statute begins with
the mandatory wording “shall,” indicating that the court must adopt a streamlining
rule.116 However, it is undermined by the language “to the extent feasible,” which
is not mandatory and relates to the defining feature of the bill—the 270-day
limit.117
In the context of the aforementioned litigation timelines, the word “feasible”
is under considerable constraint.118 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “feasible” as
“the possibility that something can be . . . done . . . or that is reasonable.”119 While
it is theoretically possible for the courts to meet this timeline, it may not be
reasonable to do so at the expense of other pending cases.120
It is not necessary to wonder if the courts will exceed this limit—they already
have.121 Courts that processed CEQA challenges to EDLPs exceeded the 270-day
limit every time.122 To date, California Governors have certified nineteen projects
as EDLPs, and CEQA challenges delayed three of them.123 The projects include
the Sacramento Kings Arena, Golden State Warriors Arena, and 8150 Sunset
Boulevard mixed-use development project.124 Assuming that the 270-day limit is
based upon calendar days, then all three projects have exceeded their allotted

113. Baker et al., supra note 106, at 3.
114. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21185 (amended by Chapter 19).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See generally JUDICIAL COUNCIL, supra note 86 (showing that judicial processing of cases can take
anywhere from one to eight years).
119. Feasibility, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
120. SENATE COMMITTEE, supra note 24, at 5–6 (citing concerns of delayed access for medical malpractice
suits, wrongful death suits, and “additional demands and burdens on our courts”).
121. Id. at 5; PAUL JACOBS, CAL. OFF. OF RSCH., POLICY MATTERS: REVIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 6–8 (2019), https://www.pcl.org/media/2019/09/2206-policy-matters04.19-environ.-leadership-projects.pdf (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
122. SENATE COMMITTEE, supra note 24, at 5; JACOBS, supra note 121, at 6–8.
123. JACOBS, supra note 121, at 6–8.
124. Id.
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timeline for review.125 The Kings Arena took 352 days, the Warriors Arena 376
days, and 8150 Sunset Boulevard 578 days—twice as long as allowed.126
Despite not meeting the deadline, however, the judicial streamlining is still
effective.127 Each of the aforementioned projects are large and complex, posing
many environmental impacts.128 However, none took as long as even a normal civil
case, and much less the three to five years CEQA review usually takes in lower
and appellate courts.129 This suggests that, while the court system is not meeting
the Legislature’s deadline, it is responding to the mandate that the courts should
process these cases quickly.130
However, SB 7 may be so popular that it will be a “victim of its own success,”
streamlining so many new projects that they will be fighting each other to receive
court review first.131 Recall, only nineteen projects have been certified as EDLPs
by the Governor in the last ten years.132 Because SB 7 expands eligibility to smaller
housing projects—and California will need hundreds of such projects to meet the
housing demand—the number of streamlined challenges could greatly increase.133
The estimated demand for housing could be met with an additional 100,000
additional units per year, and that investors will likely act quickly to meet the
pending demand.134 With such high demand for housing units and the delay EDLPs
have already experienced, SB 7 may see diminishing returns if it is even
moderately popular.135 There may be so many certified projects that they will
compete against each other for review, creating their own judicial bottleneck.136
So despite the lack of mandatory language in SB 7, the 270-day deadline will still
results in faster processing times.137 However, those gains may disappear as more
and more projects receive EDLP certification.138

125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 11.
128. JACOBS, supra note 121, at 13. (considering vehicle miles traveled and increased levels of traffic that
add to the greenhouse gas emissions).
129. Id. at 11.
130. Id.
131. SENATE COMMITTEE, supra note 24, at 7.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 34–35; Baker et al., supra note 106, at 3.
135. TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 34–35; JACOBS, supra note 121, at 6–8; SENATE COMMITTEE, supra note
24, at 7.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.

412

University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 53
C. Reforming CEQA: Preventing Frivolous Litigation
SB 7 is one of many attempts by the California Legislature to change
provisions in CEQA.139 In this year alone, California lawmakers have introduced
fourteen bills to create exemptions or streamlining provisions for CEQA, six of
which are specifically for housing.140 However, none of them address the root
issue: who may bring a CEQA lawsuit and for what specific reason.141 As it stands,
interested members of the public may bring a CEQA lawsuit anonymously, even
if their motivation has nothing to do with protecting the environment.142 To address
this, the California Legislature should amend CEQA to require either disclosure of
identity up front or a direct connection between the party’s claim and the
environment.143
Subsection 1 describes how the rules of anonymous filings are abused by
wealthy, disingenuous litigants, but are an essential tool for low-income,
environmentally impacted communities.144 Subsection 2 outlines the interests one
must have to file a CEQA lawsuit, and how these lawsuits should work to ensure
environmental preservation, not personal or business interests.145
1. Anonymity Under CEQA Is Frustrating but Essential
Anonymous litigants file nearly half of all CEQA lawsuits.146 Under California
civil procedure rules, individuals may band together as an unincorporated

139. See id. at 9 (listing seven bills related to SB 7 that either passed into law or died); SMITH-HEIMER ET
at 9–11 (listing ten bills for new CEQA exemptions and four bills for judicial streamlining for
CEQA).
140. See generally AB 762, 2022 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (prohibiting certain CEQA
exemptions for charter schools); see also AB 1547, 2022 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (requiring
environmental impacts in disadvantaged communities be mitigated within those communities); SB 506, 2022
Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (prohibiting consideration of environmental impact of vegetation management
projects); AB 297, 2022 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (exempting fire risk reduction projects from CEQA
review); AB 267, 2022 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (extending CEQA exemption for prescribed burns to
2023); AB 1154, 2022 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (exempting CEQA review for egress routes); AB 1260
, 2022 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (exempting public transit infrastructure projects from CEQA review);
SB 44, 2022 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (streamlining judicial review of CEQA challenges against
transportation projects); AB 621, 2022 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (raising judicial review of CEQA
challenges against hospitals to the substantial evidence standard); SB 37, 2022 Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021)
(expanding CEQA exemptions to sites complying with Contaminated Site Cleanup and Safety Act); SB 412, 2022
Leg., 2021–2022 Sess. (Cal. 2021) (expanding the definition of “emergency” under CEQA).
141. Hernandez, supra note 16, at 58.
142. Id. (indicating that CEQA lawsuits may be filed for businesses interests); Bland, supra note 15.
143. Hernandez, supra note 16, at 58.
144. Infra Subsection IV.C.1.
145. Infra Subsection IV.C.2.
146. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2026, at 5 (Apr.
18, 2016) (citing statistic that 45% are filed anonymously with the judge, defendant, or public not knowing their
identity) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2026].
AL., supra note 24

413

2021 / The Environment is Our Home
association when filing a lawsuit, which allows them to remain anonymous.147 The
law requires that anonymous plaintiffs reveal their identity if the lawsuit is
successful and they would like to recover court and attorney fees.148 Accordingly,
if the most important goal is to stop or delay the project—regardless of cost—the
challengers can remain anonymous doing so.149
Because the challenging parties remain anonymous, they are free to advance
their personal agendas via CEQA litigation.150 If a business competitor wants to
stop residential or commercial multi-use project construction next door, it can do
so anonymously.151 If a union is negotiating the lack of skilled labor used to
construct a project, it can use a CEQA lawsuit as leverage—without suing in its
own name.152
But by far the most active challengers are community members, commonly
known as NIMBYs.153 The acronym stands for “Not In My Back Yard,” a derisive
term for community members who object to development in their neighborhood
fearing it might lower property values.154 NIMBYs sue to stop a variety of projects,
including understandable things like manufacturing plants and prisons, but also
progressive projects such as transportation infrastructure and homeless shelters.155
NIMBYs generally support and recognize the necessity and benefit of the projects
they oppose—they just don’t want it built near them.156
Above all, NIMBYs resist housing projects and infill projects—and resistance
is growing.157 In the past decade, the percentage of CEQA lawsuits against housing

147. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1248, at 5 (Apr.
20, 2016) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1248].
148. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021.5 (West 2021).
149. COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2026, supra note 146, at 5.
150. Hernandez, supra note 16, at 59.
151. Id. at 41; COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1248, supra note 147, at 5; Bland, supra note 15.
152. Hernandez, supra note 16, at 60 (indicating that unions rarely sue in their own name, which makes
for scant statistics); id. at 66 (quoting Governor Brown on his failure to reform CEQA because of union
opposition); Bland, supra note 15.
153. JENNIFER HERNANDEZ & DANIEL GOLUB, ANALYSIS OF RECENT CHALLENGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT REPORTS 1 (2012) (stating that local organizations brought 73% of all CEQA lawsuits).
154. NIMBY: defined, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/nimby (last visited July 11,
2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
155. Theresa Clift, Sacramento Mayor Announces Plan to Stop NIMBYs from Blocking Homeless Shelters,
SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 7, 2020 11:40 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article247565260.html (on file
with the University of the Pacific Law Review); Sasha Perigo, Who are the Bay Area’s NIMBYs—and What Do
They Want?, SF CURBED (Feb. 20, 2020), https://sf.curbed.com/2020/2/20/21122662/san-francisco-bay-areanimbys-history-nimby-development (citing NIMBY opposition to a transportation project in Marin, CA).
156. NIMBY: defined, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/nimby (last visited July 11,
2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/definition/Nimby
(last visited July 11, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
157. HERNANDEZ, supra note 79, at 6 (indicating that percentage of anti-development CEQA lawsuits
against housing went from thirteen to twenty-one); HERNANDEZ & GOLUB, supra note 153, at 1 (indicating that
fifty-nine percent of CEQA lawsuits involved infill projects); Hernandez, supra note 16, at 28 (indicating that
eighty-seven percent of CEQA lawsuits involved infill projects).
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ballooned from 23% to 60%.158 Nearly half of those lawsuits target infill housing
projects, where affordable housing is in high demand and would have the most
environmentally-friendly impact.159 CEQA lawsuits against infill projects
generally went from 59% to 87% over the same time period.160
Removing anonymity for CEQA lawsuits, however, may not be desirable
because of important constitutional protections and concerns regarding access to
justice.161 In NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme Court recognized that requiring
disclosure of identity was an attack on the freedom of association, a key protection
under the First Amendment.162 Further, disclosure of party identities is often
limited to those who received financial contributions, but not individuals who
financed the litigation themselves.163 Thus, those bills would not prevent wealthy
NIMBYs from challenging housing projects, but might prevent a low-income
community who cannot self-finance a lawsuit to stop manufacturing plants.164 We
cannot deprive already impacted communities of even one less tool to advocate for
themselves, even if NIMBYs abuse it for personal interests.165
2. Ensure CEQA Lawsuits Protect the Environment
Rather than focus on who brings the lawsuit, the focus should be on why they
bring suit to ensure their motive is balanced with environmental concerns—and
housing.166 Right now, parties may bring a CEQA lawsuit even if they have a
purely economic interest that will be harmed by the project—or no direct interest
at all.167 While the lawsuit must still ultimately challenge the deficiency of an EIR,
the individual bringing it need not have a nexus with that impact.168 To ensure
158. HERNANDEZ, supra note 79, at 6 (indicating that the percentage of CEQA lawsuits against housing
went from twenty-three, to twenty-five, to sixty).
159. Hernandez, supra note 16, at 29.
160. HERNANDEZ & GOLUB, supra note 156, at 1; Hernandez, supra note 16, at 26, 28.
161. COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1248, supra note 147, at 6 (citing freedom of association concerns when
opposing a previous bill to remove anonymity for CEQA filings); COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2026, supra note
146, at 7 (criticizing the bill for only requiring plaintiffs that have accepted financial contributions).
162. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that compelled
disclosure in a group is a restraint on freedom of speech and assembly); U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting the
right of the people to freely speak and assemble).
163. See generally COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2026, supra note 146 (criticizing the bill for not requiring
disclosure of identity of all parties).
164. See Ha Chung, Note, Moving CEQA Away from Judicial Enforcement, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 319
(2020) (indicating that CEQA may assist low-income neighborhoods to prevent sources of pollution); CAL. GOV’T
CODE § 65040.12(e) (West 2021) (identifying low-income and minority groups as “environmental justice”
populations).
165. Ha Chung, supra note 164, at 319.
166. See COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1248, supra note 147, at 6 (indicating that time is better spent on
benefiting the environment rather than picking apart a party’s ulterior motives).
167. See Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 52 Cal. 4th 155, 165 (2011) (indicating
that one must be directly impacted or an individual advocating for the public interest).
168. See id. at 170 (indicating that one need not be adversely affected by an environmental impact to sue);
County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal. App. 3d 795, 798 (defining “environmental impact statement” (“EIR”)).
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CEQA lawsuits advance environmental interests, lawmakers should introduce
legislation that would limit such lawsuits to those that are directly affected by an
environmental impact of the project.169 If no such nexus exists, the impact must be
so severe as to override other pressing issues facing California—like housing.170
In general, to bring a lawsuit plaintiffs must have “standing,” meaning they
have experienced harm because of another’s conduct and a law gives them the right
to sue as a result.171 Currently under CEQA, a plaintiff has standing if they are
“beneficially interested” in stopping the project, where the project would have a
direct and substantial impact on their interest.172 This interest may be entirely
business related and devoid of environmental concern, but nevertheless, the
business has standing to challenge the EIR for the project.173 Alternatively, if a
plaintiff lacks beneficial interest, they may still bring a “citizen’s suit” citing a
“public right” in seeing that the law is enforced.174 Standing in this case is not a
matter of right, but rather must be weighed against other important societal
considerations, such as the environment.175 In contrast to “beneficial interest”
standing, a CEQA lawsuit in the public interest must have a “demonstrable concern
for protecting the environment.”176
However, not all environmental concerns are as pressing as the current housing
crisis in California.177 Recall, EIRs must assess a diverse range of environmental
impacts, all aimed at “preventing environmental damage, while providing a . . .
satisfying living environment for every Californian.”178 EIRs should make every
effort to assess the most pressing environmental impacts, such as water quality, air
quality, and reduction of GHGs.179 In contrast, EIRs should deprioritize aesthetic
concerns such as preserving a scenic vista.180
To address this, the California Legislature should narrow standing
requirements specifically for CEQA lawsuits to ensure they are primarily utilized
to advance environmental interests.181 To qualify for beneficial interest standing,
169. Save the Plastic Bag Coal., 52 Cal. 4th at 170 (finding that those with purely economic interests may
bring a CEQA lawsuit).
170. See JENNIFER HERNANDEZ ET AL., IN THE NAME OF THE ENVIRONMENT 6 (2018) (recommending that
lawsuits challenging EIRs should focus on significant adverse effects on public health).
171. Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
172. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1086 (West 2021); Save the Plastic Bag Coal., 52 Cal. 4th at 170.
173. See id. (characterizing CEQA lawsuits motivated by purely economic interests as “not unusual”).
174. Id. at 166.
175. See Bozung v. Loc. Agency Formation Com., 13 Cal. 3d 263, 272 (1975) (holding that “strict rules
of standing . . . have no application [with] broad and long-term [environmental] effects”).
176. Save the Plastic Bag Coal., 52 Cal. 4th at 169.
177. See TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 34–35 (suggesting 100,000 extra housing units be built every year to
meet demand).
178. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21000(g) (West 2021).
179. See generally Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova, 40
Cal. 4th 412 (2007) (assessing sufficiency of EIR in describing water supply to residential units); see also
LEVEL OF SERVICE, supra note 38, at 2 (describing how CEQA assesses air quality in relation to GHGs).
180. Hernandez, supra note 16, at 58.
181. See HERNANDEZ ET AL., supra note 170 at 9.
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the party’s economic interest should be affected by an environmental impact of the
project itself.182 For instance, if a housing project has an impact on traffic, and that
traffic causes economic harm to a party, then that party would have standing to sue
under CEQA.183 In contrast, if the project had an impact on GHGs, but that impact
would not adversely affect the business directly, then they would not have standing
to sue.184 However, the business could still have standing under the public interest
exception, which further underscores the need for restricting such lawsuits.185
For public interest standing, the court should carefully weigh the
environmental impact cited against the pressing public need for the project itself.186
Today, there is no ranking system for environmental impacts—the impact on a
scenic vista is the same as GHGs.187 Instead, EIRs should assess environmental
impacts based on a sliding scale, balancing the severity of the impact with the
public need for the project.188 For instance, if a housing project increased GHGs,
but is also an infill project, then the environmental benefits of infills would
outweigh the GHG impact.189 Further, if a housing project impacted a scenic vista,
then the court should assess the severity of that impact, rather than just treating it
the same as a GHG impact.190
V. CONCLUSION
No law on its own will be able to address the complexity of the housing crisis
in California.191 SB 7 attempts to address the housing crisis by increasing
affordable housing production via streamlining CEQA lawsuits that challenge
projects with environmental benefits.192 While the litigation timeline of 270 days
is not guaranteed, courts will likely process such cases far faster than the current
timeline of three to five years.193 By creating a relatively definite litigation

182. See id. at 9 (suggesting that CEQA lawsuits should not be brought for non-environmental reasons).
183. Id. at 81.
184. See id. at 28 (noting that modifying CEQA’s standing requirements to align with NEPA would result
in environmental groups maintaining standing for projects with large environmental impacts).
185. See Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 52 Cal. 4th 155, 169 (2011) (holding
that corporate parties are not subject to heightened scrutiny for asserting public interest standing).
186. See generally HERNANDEZ ET AL., supra note 170, at 16 (discussing the relative importance of housing
over other environmental concerns).
187. See id. at 16 (indicating that environmental impacts do not have a “ranking” system).
188. See id. at 16 (noting that the lack of a sliding scale results in litigations over policy trade-offs).
189. SCHROEER, supra note 47, at 1 (discussing the environmental benefit of infill projects as having lower
GHGs).
190. HERNANDEZ ET AL., supra note 170, at 16 (suggesting that impacting an individual’s view may
invalidate an EIR despite other environmental benefits).
191. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 10 (describing California’s housing crisis as a combination of
factors).
192. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, supra note 19, at 3.
193. JACOBS, supra note 121, at 11.
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deadline, SB 7 incentivizes developers to invest in environmentally certified
housing projects, thereby easing the housing crisis in California.194
However, SB 7’s effectiveness may be short-lived if it is not accompanied with
other targeted CEQA reforms.195 While streamlining judicial review is important,
lawmakers should make every effort to limit CEQA challenges that do not have
the environment’s best interest.196 Since removing anonymity to see who is suing
would violate important constitutional protections, requiring the reason they are
suing to be environmental protection is the more effective reform.197 Such
legislation would enhance SB 7, ensuring that if challengers truly seek to protect
the environment, then the courts will quickly review these lawsuits.198
California’s natural environment is of paramount importance.199 CEQA is a
necessary tool in protecting that environment.200 Yet, it should not get in its own
way by preventing environmentally friendly housing projects that communities
throughout California desperately need.201

194. See Baker et al., supra note 6, at 3 (suggesting that uncertainty causes investors to hold off developing
even if demand is high).
195. See SENATE COMMITTEE, supra note 24, at 7 (suggesting that SB 7 may be so effective at streamlining
that certified projects will start delaying each other).
196. See Hernandez, supra note 16, at 58 (indicating individuals may file CEQA lawsuits for nonenvironmental reasons); Bland, supra note 15.
197. See COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1248, supra note 147, at 6 (suggesting that removing anonymous
filings would violate constitutional protections of freedom of assembly); id. (indicating the focus should be on
environmental merits rather than discerning a party’s concealed intentions).
198. HERNANDEZ ET AL., supra note 170, at 88 (suggesting that reform is needed to ensure CEQA
challenges actually benefit the environment).
199. See generally Sacramento Bee, California’s Biggest Environmental Challenges? Water. Climate
Change. Political Hot Air., SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/influencers/article216465815.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (citing
environmental concerns given the of importance of ecosystems, plant, and animal life).
200. HERNANDEZ ET AL., supra note 170, at 77 (citing a news article that says “CEQA is a critical and
necessary piece of legislation”).
201. See generally HERNANDEZ, supra note 79, at 6 (that CEQA abuse has resulted in less protection for
the environment).

418

Delete this page

Delete this page

